Abstract：There is little question that issues such as accelerating climate change，environmental degradation，rainforest depletion，and pollution have anthropogenic causes，and that these factors put the survival of the human species in jeopardy.In response to this，one often hears and reads about the urgent need to“save Mother Nature，”or claims related to the fact that humans are ultimately“part of Nature”and therefore vulnerable to it. Arguably，these seemingly innocuous and tautological claims mask a precarious“onto-taxonomical”assumption，a term coined by Graham Harman in order to emphasise the broadly diffused tendency to postulate an a-priori difference between humans and nature.In this paper，I seek to achieve two specific goals：first，I consider Harman’s underdeveloped yet important notion of“onto-taxonomy，”framing it in relation to issues pertaining to anthropocentrism，the Anthropocene，and ecology.Second，I shall defend Harman’s position against specific ecological criticisms of his philosophy in order to hold that Object-Oriented Philosophy（OOP）is in fact especially well-suited for a radical revaluation of ecological thinking more generally and our present state more specifically..
Keywords：de-anthropocentrism；onto-taxonomy；ecological view
The Covid-19 pandemic，and our current environmental condition more generally，have provoked calls for the drastic and urgent rethinking of issues concerning the nature of nature and our specific place within it.There is little question that issues such as accelerating climate change，environmental degradation，rainforest depletion，and pollution have anthropogenic causes，and that they put the survival of the human species in jeopardy.In response to this，one often hears and reads about the urgent need to“save Mother Nature，”or claims related to the fact that humans are ultimately“part of Nature”and therefore vulnerable to it.While there is no disputing the fact that our situation is acceleratingly leading us towards an unpredictable，unstable，and undesirable future，I am nevertheless of the view that these seemingly innocuous and tautological aforementioned claims mask a precarious“onto-taxonomical”assumption.The latter term was coined by Graham Harman in order to emphasise the broadly diffused tendency to postulate an a-priori difference between two categories of being，in this case between humans and nature.Yet Harman’s specific idea—dubbed Object-Oriented Philosophy（henceforth，OOP）—has been directly or tacitly accused of being ill-suited for an ecological understanding of our current situation，since it is said that he undermines both change and ecological thinking by overemphasizing non-relational“withdrawn”or“vacuum-sealed”entities which are incapable of interaction.
In light of the above，the current paper has two specific aims：first，I shall seek to consider Harman’s underdeveloped yet important notion of“onto-taxonomy，”framing it in relation to issues pertaining to anthropocentrism，the Anthropocene，and ecology—understood here in the loose sense of the study of relations between entities. Second，I shall also defend Harman’s position against specific ecological criticisms of his philosophy in order to argue that OOPis in fact especially well-suited for a drastic revaluation of ecological thinking more generally and our present state more specifically.In order to achieve these goals，I shall proceed as follows：first，I will analyse and assess Harman’s critique of onto-taxonomical thought. Second，I shall provide a brief reworked account of OOPmore generally，and of the meaning of the term“object”more specifically.Third，I will then go on to consider representative critiques of OOPas anti-ecological in order to finally respond to these criticisms by showing that Harman’s critique of onto-taxonomy—as well as his philosophy more generally—entails a forceful de-anthropocentric and ecological perspective，albeit one whichrequiresboththerethinkingof ecologyinphilosophyandthe reassessment of the statusofhumansasbeingswhichareoftendeemedtobeeitheronewithnatureorradicallydifferentfromit.
Harman’s Critique of Onto-Taxonomy
Harman’s relatively overlooked term“onto-taxonomy”first emerged towards the middle of his 2016 work’，but has not appeared in any of his other works since，bar the recently published article“The Only Exit From Modern Philosophy.”Its relative neglect is in my view especially unfortunate when one considers Harman’s claim that it represents the“main target”of his specific form of“Object-Oriented Ontology”（OOO），and for this reason I shall provide an in-depth analysis of its meaning and implications.may be roughly understood to refer to the philosophical study of being or existence in general，whiledenotes the science involved with demarcation，separation，and classification. The expression“onto-taxonomy”therefore combines these two terms. Harman uses it critically to refer to a deeply entrenched assumption of a division（or taxonomy）between at least two distinct ontological domains. The standard implicit double move of all forms of onto-taxonomy is as follows：first，onto-taxonomical thought starts by corralling a series of alleged superior attributes possessed by a specific kind of entity.Second，it then tacitly proceeds to the lofty conclusion that such exceptional qualities bestow upon this kind of being an outstanding ontological status which serves to clearly distinguish it from everything it is defined against. The tendency of Western Medieval philosophy was to award this privileged status to God. With the rise of Modern philosophy however，this privileged role saw an increasing shift towards the human，and this tendency may still even be observed in some alleged“anti-”or“post-humanist”philosophies which are paradoxically quick to pronounce the end of the human while retaining its ontological privileges.In its modern and contemporary expressions，onto-taxonomy therefore enforces an a-priori categorical difference between a domain reserved for human beings and their products（culture，technology），and another for everything else that is supposedly non-human（mechanical or irrational）and/or does not form part of their unique traits（the“world”or“nature”taken as a whole）.
It may then be noted that there are essentially two distinct modalities of onto-taxonomy，and I propose to call these“gap”and“correlationist”onto-taxonomies.The former is so called on account of its postulation of a presumed radicalseparating the human from everything else.The most prominent historical proponent of this form is to be found in Descartes’s categorical distinction between two kinds of substances，namely minds or thinking things（）and bodies or extended ones（）.Furthermore，it is worth noting that this categorical distinction between humans and everything else becomes even more prominent in his categorization of animals as；when Descartes describes animals in this way，he is not simply saying that they are inferior to man because they are purely instinctive，operating on the basis of an unthinking stimulus/response mechanism.Rather，what he suggests is that this is a purelyautomatism which therefore belongs exclusively within the realm of the extended.Another exemplar of this form of onto-taxonomy is to be found in Immanuel Kant’s distinction between two radically different realms；the world of phenomena，namely the world as it appears to humans through two forms of intuition and twelve categories，and the noumenal world of things considered in and of themselves independently of one’s access to them.It should be noted in passing that the relation between the two domains in each of these examples is asymmetrical and anthropocentric，in that the human related side of the dichotomy is always privileged over its other.
The second“correlationist”form of onto-taxonomy is more common in contemporary post-Kantian philosophy.This name is evidently inspired by Quentin Meillassoux’s seminal work entitled，where he defines“correlationism”as“the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being，and never to either term considered apart from the other.”Following Meillassoux，correlationist onto-taxonomy may thus be described in terms of the tendency to postulate an—as opposed to a radical separation—between two ontological domains.More specifically，it can be understood to refer to philosophies that insist on a permanent and privileged relational connexion between humans on the one hand and everything else on the other，such that it becomes impossible to think Being-and relations between various beings-independently of their relation to the human and vice-versa.This form of onto-taxonomy is more noticeable in philosophies of an idealist persuasion，and it would also be possible to show that it is especially prominent in various forms of postmodernism and phenomenology in spite of their explicit qualms against idealism.By way of a brief example，in，Edmund Husserl rejects the realism/idealism dispute as a retrograde pseudo-problem，and regards both positions as“in principle absurd.”In spite of this，he clearly veers towards an idealist form of“correlationism”when he insists on the permanent correlation between the intentional act（）and its corresponding object（）.To be sure，Husserl maintains that the latter is neither in consciousness nor in the real（mind-independent）world.He nevertheless also claims that there is no conscious act without a corresponding object and vice-versa，and this in turn illustrates the permanent correlation between the two.
Despite all the possible disparities between“gap”and“correlationist”philosophies，both ultimately remain tethered to onto-taxonomical thought，and this is insofar as they jointly start off with the supposition that there aredistinct ontological realms，and that these would either need mediational bridging—as is the case with gap onto-taxonomy—or that they are always already interwoven—in the case of correlational onto-taxonomy.It is also worth noting that epistemologically centred variants of realism—or，better，materialism—such as those of Meillassoux also in effect remain tethered to onto-taxonomy，and this in turn hints at important differences between the latter’s thought and that of Harman.Summarily stated，Meillassoux’s specific materialism accepts the“irruption”of thought from matter（and hence maintains a radical distinction between them），and argues that the former is in principle capable of attaining direct knowledge of the latter.Conversely，Harman argues that any and all potential differences between entities in general are to be thought of as differences in.To be sure，the critique of onto-taxonomy does not require that we believe humans to be no different from a mouse or pile of garbage，as OOP has sometimes been accused of doing，for it is very possible to argue that humans do have characteristics which make them different from other beings more generally.Nevertheless，these differences would not warrant an ontology based on categorical distinctions between humans and everything else，and far less the view that humans have a privileged access to being.I am of the view that one way to elucidate this last point would be to briefly compare Harman’s position here to that of Jacques Derrida.In，the latter simultaneously maintains both a structural continuity between life and non-life，but also argues for an infinite number of specific differences—or“heterogeneous multiplicities”—between emergent living.Similarly，Harman believes that there is a continuity between life and non-life to the extent that both living and non-living entities are“objects.”Nevertheless，he also holds that objects are always singular existents，such that there is ultimately no category of the“animal”or“natural”to which the human is opposed.
In’，Harman lists three motives for the rejection of onto-taxonomical thinking：first，onto-taxonomy evades the ontological question of specific singularities or existents by tacitly or explicitly privileging humans，and then proceeds to infer a shoddy ontology based on categorical distinctions between the human on the one hand and everything else on the other.Second，onto-taxonomical thought disallows philosophy from discussing inter-objective relations in their own right，since it assumes that philosophy should limit itself to the discussion of the difference or correlation between the two exclusive domains which it assumes in advance.Finally，and most crucially for the task of the present paper，onto-taxonomy is thoroughly，since it assumes the strict distinction between humans and everything else，as if it were possible to lump individual beings on one side of the ontological equation，and then proceed to give humans ontological ascendency by extricating them from everything else.Furthermore，if we broadly assume ecology to entail the study of relations between entities，then onto-taxonomy’s decision to combine all beings into an indifferent ontological category such as“the World”or“Nature as a whole”would also bein that it discounts the possibility of considering howemergent entities and phenomena impact and affect other individuals.
Having established the fundamental tenets of Harman’s critique of onto-taxonomy，I now turn to his proposed three-pronged path beyond such modes of thought.Since I have already written about this elsewhere，I will here briefly focus on those elements of Harman’s account which are most pertinent to the task of the present paper，namely the analysis of“onto-taxonomy”in relation to issues concerning anthropocentrism，the Anthropocene，and ecology.In keeping with my previous work，I propose to call Harman’s threefold solutions“ontological democracy，”“ontological accretionism，”and“non-reciprocal entanglement.”
The first of these involves the claim that reality is not made up of only two categories of being，but is rather composed of infinitely many singular existents or“objects”in Harman’s specific sense.In other words，OOP may be said to adopt a pluralist（rather than dualist or monist）and flat（rather than hierarchical）ontology in which“all objects are equally objects，”even if I shall shortly show that not all are equally real.This view is de-anthropocentric to the extent that it regards humans as no less of an“object”than a mouse，tree，piece of paper，or pen.It is also crucial for the rethinking of ecology insofar as it grants every being equal dignity，in the specific sense that it emphasises each and every individual’s impact on reality rather than giving priority to humans or to certain objects over others.
Ontological accretionism entails the rejection of the classical distinction between substances and aggregates，given that such a position grants ontological priority to the former at the expense of the latter，and also creates a taxonomical distinction between one fundamental layer of natural entities（substances）and another secondary one composed of merely relational，artificial，or technological aggregates.In contrast，OOP claims that every existent is a“multiplicity that is also somehow one，”irrespective of whether the existent is human and non-human，natural and artificial，or a hybrid of all of these.To elaborate，Harman is of the view that every entity is primarily an emergent whole，unit，or substance，and that it therefore has no parts.More specifically，he believes that once a being emerges through relations between its component elements，it is simultaneously boththe sum of its parts—to the extent that it can gain or lose parts while subsisting as the same individual—andthan the sum of its parts—insofar as an emergent individual does not exhibit the properties of all its component parts.Nevertheless，he also holds that each and every individual is at the same time necessarily composed of parts on its interior，and that some objects are“hybrid entities”which unify a mixture of natural，social，and technological elements.Harman’s position here is best illustrated with reference to the following concrete example：an individual windmill is relatively autonomous from its external relations with other entities，and therefore acts as a unity relative to its environ.Nevertheless，the windmill is itself also a relational composite of technological，natural，and artificial objects，and the same thing goes for each of its parts.In other words，for Harman，the windmill itself“is not located at the basement of the universe at all，since a layer of constituent pieces swarms beneath it，another layer beneath that one，and so forth，”to the effect that all objects are“decomposable into further［entities］”This therefore entails the postulation of an infiniteof objects.Crucially however，this infinite regress does not necessitate an infinite“upwards into larger and larger entities and finally into some‘world as a whole，’since there is nothing forcing substances to enter into combination with other substances.”
Finally，and relatedly，“non-reciprocal entanglement”entails the rejection of the notion of a“World”or“Nature”as a whole made up of immanent，holistically entangled，entities standing in conflict with human transcendence.As Tom Sparrow points out in his essay“Ecological Trust，”the environment is not something essentially opposed to the human，but is rather composed of a highly complex and plural“［］”in which we humans are simply one ingredient.Furthermore，and crucially，he argues that our daily lives and survival depends on a“pervasive and unknowingin animate and inanimate objects.”Yet trust always harbours the possibility of being，such that it would follow that entities are both interdependent or entangled with each other to some extent，but also，to use Timothy Morton’s words，“strange strangers”to one another to the extent that they are more than any possible knowledge we can attain about them，or any of the relations they enter into more generally，hence the reason why we must think of inter-objective relations as asymmetrical，non-reciprocal，and open to being disrupted.
The critique of onto-taxonomy，as well as the solutions just outlined necessarily give rise to the following questions：first，given that there are infinitely many“objects，”what is the precise meaning and status of“object”within Harman’s specific schema？Second，does Harman’s view that objects do not interact directly undermine an ecological view of reality？Does Harman end up endorsing an anthropocentric position in which the human ends up becoming the sole causal mediator between entities？I shall address both of these queries in the sections that follow.
Outline of OOP
Before discussing critiques of Harman’s view，it would be necessary to inquire into the meaning of the term“object”within Harman’s specific philosophy.As the label suggests，Object-Oriented Philosophy is dedicated to the study of individual entities or，to use Harman’s preferred term，“objects.”In order to explicate the meaning and ontological status of the latter，Harman typically frames his ontology in terms of a“quadruple”or“fourfold”model composed of real and sensual objects and their corresponding（real and sensual）qualities.Nevertheless，I shall here rework this model by suggesting that this particular ontology may also be framed in terms of what I propose to call the“negative”and“positive”theses on objects.Negatively stated，an object in OOP refers to anything which is ontologically irreducible，or—in Harman’s words—anything which cannot be“undermined，”“overmined，”or“duomined.”He dubs such positions“radical，”tracing the term to the Latin word“”meaning“root.”This is in so far as he holds that all these philosophiesthe multiplicity of singular entities or objects to a more fundamental root cause.Yet the difference between them，as I shall show shortly，lies in the fact that they are said to strip objects of their ontological dignity by either reducing them downwards—or“undermining”them—in favour of their more basic constituent parts，or by dissolving them upwards—or“overmining”them—into their givenness to a subject，actions or relations.
Undermining refers to all philosophical positions which maintain that individual objects do not constitute the basis of all reality，given that they are ultimately the secondary effect or fictitiousof some deeper real stratum，process，or fundamental reality which constitutes them.Harman claims that undermining philosophies come in two essential forms，and I propose to call these“monistic underminers”and“atomic underminers.”The latter hold the view that so-called mid-sized entities such as baseballs and windows are ultimately nothing but their most basic constituent particles.For example，a baseball or window，for such thinkers，is nothing more than its basic composite units arranged“window-wise”or“baseball-wise.”This form of undermining dates back to Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Thales，Anaximenes，Democritus，Leucippus and Empedocles，and it may be found to this day in many contemporary scientific and philosophical forms of reductionism and eliminativism.One particular instance of the latter position would be Trenton Merricks，who argues that the only truly existing（material）entities are the ones possessing“nonredundant causal powers，”namely those objects which cause events not caused by their parts.Furthermore，it is also worth noting that his specific position is entirely onto-taxonomical，in that he holds that there are only two kinds of things satisfying the aforementioned definition，namely microscopic“atoms”and humans（defending the latter’s existence on account of mental causation）.In contrast to atomic underminers，“monistic”ones reduce reality to a more primal unarticulated whole（rather than a set of basic units）.Parmenides and Anaximander constitute the most prominent ancient examples of such forms of undermining，and Harman names philosophers such as Heidegger and Levinas as contemporary heirs to this mode of thought.
It may then be noted that he finds undermining to be problematic for two main reasons：first，he claims that such positions are“depressingly two-layered”insofar as they insist on a two-world taxonomical gap between a basic level consisting only of basic units or unformatted whole，and another derivative surface plane made of eliminable individual entities.Second，Harman observes that all forms of undermining are unable to properly explain why a single monistic lump or a limited number of basic units would emerge into a“landscape of highly specific individual beings.”It is worth noting that undermining positions are necessarily onto-taxonomical in that they implicitly state that individual objects which we refer to in our“folk ontology”only exist at a level which is pertinent to our experience.In this way，they thereby draw a taxonomical distinction between the realm of the really real，and that of the human.
The flipside of undermining is overmining.Rather than reducing reality downwards to a more fundamental foundation，the latter reduces reality upwards by claiming that objects or entities are nothing more than their evident qualities，relations，givenness，or effects，irrespective of whether these are understood as human-world relations（as happens，for instance，in what came to be known as“social constructionism”）or inter-object relations（as is typical with the philosophies of Bruno Latour and Alfred North Whitehead）.It would again be possible to identify two main forms of overmining，namely“correlationist overmining”and“relationist overmining.”The former maintains that entities are reducible to their“correlation”to the human.Following Meillassoux，it may be asserted that the absolute majority of Kantian and Post-Kantian philosophies implicitly or explicitly endorse such a position to the extent that they remain obsessed with the more primary relation or“correlation”between thought and the world rather than focussing on the latter in itself.It is clear that this form of overmining is essentially the equivalent of correlationist onto-taxonomy in that it reduces the real to the human/world correlate.Relationist overmining is different in that it refuses to give primacy to the human-world relation，and for this reason it is not onto-taxonomical in the strict sense.Nevertheless，it is still problematic to the extent that it reduces entities to their actions and effects on each other.Bruno Latour provides us with an explicit example of this form of overmining when he maintains that entities—or what he calls“actors”—are ultimately nothing other than what they modify，transform，perturb，or create.Harman’s major qualm with all forms of overmining lies in their ultimate inability to explain change，since the perspective that things are exhausted by their relation to a subject or to all other things lapses into a relational holism which in turn makes change illusory.
It may then be noted that Harman treats undermining and overmining as two contrasting reductionist approaches.Nevertheless，he also claims that these two mining philosophies sometimes join forces in a simultaneous“two-faced reduction”which he dubs“duomining.”For Harman，duomining tendencies are most conspicuous in scientific forms of materialism，since the latterundermine objects with the claim that“ultimate particles，fields，strings，or indeterminate“matter”［constitutes］the ultimate layer of the cosmos，”and overmine objects by arguing that“mathematics can exhaust the primary qualities of this genuine layer.”It is clear that duomining is onto-taxonomical in that it starts off by supposing a strict distinction between thought and matter，and it also assumes that the former is capable of direct access to the latter.
On my reading，the“negative”features of the object just discussed licence what I call Harman’s“positive”features of the object.To elaborate，if an object cannot be reduced to its sum total of aggregate parts and qualities or into its effects and relations，it would then follow that each and every object is both aover and above its parts and qualities，andfrom its relations and the context in which it inheres；unity and autonomy therefore constitute the positive features of the object.It would then be important to point out that Harman’s ontology in actual fact distinguishes between two kinds of objects，namely real objects（RO）and sensual ones（SO）.I hold that Harman provides two crucial definitions of the former，even if the first of these characterisations is more frequently emphasised than the second in the current literature.Firstly，a real object may be defined in terms of its“withdrawal”from its relations in the sense that it exists in excess of them.This notion of“withdrawal”accentuates the idea that all such objects have their own non-relational interior in spite of their various relations and effects，and it is in this sense that they can be understood to be autonomous.This specific term also emphasises that each real object is incapable ofinteraction with another object，such that all inter-objective exchanges have to occur indirectly or“vicariously.”I shall discuss this aspect of OOO later on，given its importance for the present paper.Secondly，Harman argues that a real object refers to any entity which“into anthat hasof its own.”This quote in turn accounts for the unity of the real object，and it also contains three additional implications：first，a real object always necessarilyas a unified entity by virtue of sustaining relations between its component parts.Second，a real object must necessarily always be composed of component，which are in turn also to be considered objects in their own right.Lastly，each real object must possess its own individuating real qualities（RQ），even if the real object is itself irreducible to the latter.
As I have just pointed out，the real object withdraws from its relations，such that it cannot entertain any direct causal interactions with another object.As a result，Harman claims that real objects interact with sensual caricatures or translations of the corresponding real objects.Thus，the sensual object（SO）is a unified entity which exists only within the experience of a real object，with the caveat being that a real object need not necessarily be human or even living. In other words，the sensual object refers to the way in which one real object translates or“experiences”another real object.Yet this sensual object is also autonomous in the limited sense that it cannot be reduced to the various sensual qualities（SQ）which it manifests at any given point in time.In spite of the distinction between the real and the sensual，Harman claims that these two modalities of reality remain deeply intertwined in the following twofold manner：first，a sensual object（SO）is indirectly connected to the individual real qualities（RQ）of an object，and this is insofar as such qualities account for its individuality.Second the sensual qualities（SQ）also connect to the real object（RO）even if the latter is never directly accessed.
The schema just outlined can then be illustrated by means of an example drawn from Harman’s illustration of an oil rig siphoning oil in his bookAn oil rig and the crude oil may both be said to be real objects within the schema outlined above，and this in turn means that they are to be regarded as emergent entities possessing various real qualities. Nevertheless，it would follow from Harman’s thesis of withdrawal that the oil rig never interacts directly with the oil in itself.As a result，it translates the oil into the rig’s own terms—i.e.into a sensual object with sensual qualities—reducing it to“fuel，”which is in turn a mere caricature of its actual reality.Needless to say，the oil itself is not the product of the rig，such that the sensual qualities of the oil experienced by the rig are also indirectly connected to the real oil in itself，even if the latter never comes within the purview of the rig.Furthermore，the oil within the“experience”of the rig must also possess individuating real qualities.
The negative and positive definitions of the object just outlined，when coupled with the three solutions to onto-taxonomy discussed in the previous section，have two crucial consequences for the task of the present paper：the first implication is that OOPconceives of being as an ecologically open-ended network of unified and autonomous individual haecceities which somehow relate but are not holistically intertwined.In other words，Harman’s theses discussed above reject the old hat that“everything is interconnected，”and instead draw attention to the fact that a lot of work must be done in order to bring individual entities into（indirect）relation，and that some never relate at all.Second，OOP decentralises the crucial role given to humans by anthropocentric ontologies，since it places them on a par with all other singular entities，thereby stressing the crucial fact that humans are not the other of nature，but rather depend for their survival on the multitude of entities which they enter into relations with.Yet as I have already shown above，one of Harman’s crucial claims is that haecceities cannot be overmined or reduced to the relations they enter into，and this in turn necessitates the claim that they exist autonomously from said associations.In his earlier work，Harman often described entities as being essentially“vacuum-sealed”and thereforeof entertainingwith other entities.Such claims have in turn prompted dismissals of Harman’s specific variety of OOO，with some thinkers claiming that this alleged extreme non-relational view of objects makes OOP especially ill-equipped for dealing with a post-anthropocentric ecological ontology dealing withbetween entities within a given environment.The next section shall be dedicated to the analysis of such critiques.
Critiques of OOOas Anthropocentric andAnti-Ecological
From the analysis above，it is clear that OOPviews objects as weakly rather than strongly connected.Essentially，Harman explains this difference as follows：weak connection entails a“flat ontology，”namely the ontologically democratic view（discussed above）that“objects belong to a single network，”to the effect that there can be no onto-taxonomic hierarchical“separation between mind and matter，spiritual and corporeal，or anything else of the sort.”Contrastingly，to say that entities areconnected is to maintain an overmining position in which entities are entirely constituted relationally and utterly determined by their associations or more general process or flux of becoming.One particularly interesting instance of the latter position is provided by Matthew Calarco in his essay“The Three Ethologies，”where he claims that social ethology aims to study social life and relations of animals and humans alike，rightly refusing the age-old assumption of a strict ontological—or，better，onto-taxonomical—division between these two categories.While he recognises that the social ontology he is describing is‘very much a realist one’，he nevertheless claims that one must
［...］not to reduce realism to the notion that ontological relations are somehow fully pre-existent and simply discovered，or that they occur across bounded，sealed-off entities that somehow persist in their identity and entirely withdraw from one another［…］the beings that sustain these［social］relations are themselves transformed by them and opened onto each other in ways that undercut traditional ontologies of singularity.
The tacit reference to OOPis here evident from his use of the theme of“withdrawal.”Furthermore，Calarco’s implicit critique of Harman and other alleged“traditional”ontologies of singularity would not be surprising at all，given that the strong position discussed earlier often implies a relational holism or“relationist overmining”position which has become the standard view in much contemporary theory.
Given the prevalence of such views，and as I have already stated above，Harman’s emphasis on objects and“withdrawal”or non-relationality has unsurprisingly garnered a number of critiques beyond the one just referenced.Two such critiques run as follows：first，it is said that OOP is not well suited for dealing with the age of the Anthropocene since it gives priority to objects over subjects.Second，OOPis said to have devastating consequences for ecological thinking，since it champions a non-relational view which makes it difficult to explain how things relate to begin with.I shall here consider two representative examples of these criticisms whilst offering my own rejoinder to them，and in so doing I shall also later show how Harman“weak”view of inter-objective connection can be compatible with his non-relational view of objects more specifically，and with ecological thinking more generally.
The first critique I shall briefly consider is the one put forward by Peter Gratton.It is worth quoting him at some length when，in his book entitled：，he writes the following：
［S］ince at least 2000，when P.J.Crutzen defined the“Anthropocene，”we have been all-too-aware—surely before that time as well—about the effect of human activities on what we dub nature.To describe，then，the power of things at preciselytime could have the feel of an alibi for the human responsibility in the ecological strife in and around us.This short citation requires unpacking.In the first sentence，Gratton rightly claims that the increasing awareness of the Anthropocene should have led us humans to become more attentive to the impact of our activities.Furthermore，by stating that what bears the brunt of this impact is“whatnature，”he seems to be implicitly stating a point stressed earlier，namely that in our age it is no longer possible to think onto-taxonomically in terms of humansnature.Nevertheless，this point is immediately followed by Gratton’s tacit claim that an object-oriented view such as Harman’s is devastating for thinking our current ecological situation，since it emphasises“objects”or“things”at the expense of the human，and thus ultimately serves as a cop-out designed to absolve humans of all ecological responsibility.
I have a number of specific qualms with such a position.In the first instance，by suggesting that positions such as that of OOP favour objects over subjects，Gratton is making the onto-taxonomic assumption that the former is the opposite of the latter.Contrastingly，given the thesis of ontological democracy discussed in the first section above，it is clear that a human is no less an“object”—to be understood here in Harman’s specific sense—than any other，such that the attention paid to the latter does not exclude humans and their specific activities，but rather treats them as one player within our ecosystem.One may however contend that our current geological era has been dubbed the Anthropocene precisely because we live in an age where humans have affected the environment to the degree that the atmosphere and planet Earth itself could very well be viewed as being essentially produced by activities related specifically to the human species.Such a fact ought to attest to the colossal impact of the human specifically，and this would in turn warrant the special attention given to humans.My response is that such an objection confuses the cause with the fact.More specifically，I do not deny that humans have an immense causal impact on the variety of animate and inanimate entities populating the ecosystem，such that it would now be difficult to think of what the latter might look like without the human today.Yet such a claim does not entail the conclusion that humans should be given special interest in analyses of our current situation.Stated differently，humans are most definitely a crucialingredient of the Anthropocene，but the latter’sas a brute fact does not depend on the human since its emergence into being is sustained whether humans are here to witness it or not.Harman’s specific position might therefore suggest replacing the notion of the Anthropocene with that of the“Symbiocene，”a term I borrow from Glenn A.Albercht.Stated as summarily as possible，the notion of the Anthropocene tends to emphasise the，that is，humans and their activities.Contrastingly，the notion of the Symbiocene emphasisesor the close association between different entities.As may be noted，the latter decentralises the principal role accorded to the human by propagating a“flat ontology”in which all entities are loosely yet non-reciprocally entangled，and also share ontological equality.Furthermore，I also question Gratton’s suggestion that the emphasis on objects entails absolving humans of ecological responsibility，and whether the Anthropocene necessitates that we build an ethics of the human alone.Against such a claim，I hold that Harman’s renewed emphasis on the object in factour ecological responsibility by showing that we are indeed intertwined with the entities we interact with，that we live in a state of“ecological trust”where bonds between entities are set but also fragile and open to disruption，such that even the objects we create have an ecological impact which stretches well beyond our possible means of access.
A related yet more direct critique of Harman comes from fellow object-oriented thinker Levi Bryant.In his“The Interior of Things：The Origami of Being，”Bryant mounts a two-pronged yet interrelated critique of Harman’s specific form of OOO.The first of these critiques advances the claim that Harman’s view of entities as“withdrawn”or“vacuum-sealed”“undermines the entire ecological dimension of being insofar as it conceives beings as fundamentally self-enclosed and unrelated.”This claim is important in that it contains a tacit argument which may be summarised as follows：it begins with the premiss that Harman’s objects are utterly withdrawn，and hence wholly non-relational.As Bryant puts it，“the outcome of Harman’s object-oriented philosophy is that real objects cannot relate because they are so thoroughly withdrawn they never touch in any way.”The second premiss tacitly assumes that the very idea of ecology necessarily entails a relational—or rather relation—view of entities.From these two premisses，Bryant then concludes that Harman’s thesis of withdrawal is at odds with an ecological view of reality.I however question the soundness of Bryant’s argument，since I hold that the claims contained in both premisses are in effect at least questionable if not false.More specifically，against Bryant’s first premiss，I hold that Harman’s thesis of“withdrawal”does not entail the claim that entities are entirely separate（even if Harman’s choice of words might sometimes suggest this），for it would be very possible to claim—as does Harman—that objects are shielded fromrelation，but also do in fact relate，thereby forming loose alliancesThe possibility of such a claim shall be investigated in the next section.My qualm with Bryant’s second premiss is that ecology implies relationality.While it is true that ecology studies relations between individuals，it does not follow that this must necessarily involve the supposition that said relations are to be assumed in advance，and that entities are thereforeconnected as per the distinction discussed earlier.As I shall show in the subsequent section，Harman does not deny that entities relate；rather what he negates is that such relations are to be taken as a given，and that therefore entities relate effortlessly.
Bryant’s second critique of Harman is more serious，since it involves the claim that OOPleads to a solipsism in which we are never quite sure whether the real object exists to begin with.He illustrates this critique through an example of a squirrel climbing a tree.As I have already suggested in the first part of this paper，both the squirrel and the tree would be considered real objects in Harman’s ontology.Yet I have also pointed out that OOP is based on the claim that the squirrel withdraws from the tree and vice-versa，to the effect that the squirrel climbing the tree can only relate to ita sensual object，and it is to be assumed that the same goes for the tree in relation to the squirrel.Bryant claims that to the extent that a squirrel relates directly to a sensual tree but not to a real one，it becomes“difficult to see how the squirrel can be related to a tree at all，for where objects are withdrawn beings can never know what it is that they are related to.”It is in this way that Bryant accuses Harman of perpetuating a“pan-solipsism where，at best，we can say that there are sensuous trees，squirrels，and clowns for us，without ever being able to determine whether there are real trees，squirrels，and clowns.”As a result，he claims that Harman’s“heroic attempt to preserve objects against any incursions or reductions［namely‘undermining，’‘overmining，’and‘duomining’］leads to the deep riddle of［…］what merits our ontological commitment to the existence of any objects.”This second critique once again rests on the assumption that since a real squirrel does not relate directly to a real tree，then it does not relate to the latter at all.Yet as I have already suggested，Harman in fact claims that real objects are indeed both related and not related.To be sure，Bryant recognises this possible Harmanian rejoinder，but he also argues that this is not a viable option given the thesis of“withdrawal.”I nevertheless disagree with Bryant，and in the following section I shall provide a response to such a critique—as well as to the ones outlined throughout this section—by taking a close look at Harman’s notion of indirect or“vicarious”causation，in order to show how this account provides the possibility for indirect relation more specifically，and for an object-oriented ecology more generally.
Vicarious Ecologies
We now come to a pressing question that may be directly deduced from Harman’s general ontology as well as Bryant’s critique above，and it may be formulated thus：if，as Harman often asserts，entities withdraw from all and any form of direct relation，how is it even possible for them to relate to begin with？The short answer to this question，as I have already suggested earlier，is that real objects do in fact relate，but they do so，using the sensual object as a mediator between relations，and the sensual ether more generally（i.e.the tension between the sensual object and its qualities）as a mediumthrough which interactions take place.To elaborate，it may then be noted that Harman’s specific object-oriented approach differs from other forms of OOO in that it distinguishes between two modalities of relation，namely“sincerity”and“allure.”The former may be roughly described as an ordinary state of affairs in which one real objectanother，yet onlyto a sensual translation of it.Thus，Bryant’s example of a squirrel climbing a tree would count as a case of sincerity in Harman’s schema，since in this case，the squirrel is intending the real tree，yet it only relates to it as a sensual object with its sensual qualities and affordances，translating it into“equipment”for climbing or procuring food for instance.Here one can see that the sensual tree experienced by the squirrel is not entirely detached from the real tree as Bryant assumes，for it is in fact connected to it in two ways：first，and as I have already shown in the second section above，the sensual tree experienced by the squirrel indirectly points to the real qualities of the tree itself.Second，the sensual qualities of the tree emanate from the real tree as much as they do from the sensual one，even if the former real object never comes directly into the view of the squirrel，since the squirrel’s experience is buffered by the sensual ether.It would then be important to point out that sincerity describes the standard state of affairs of all beings，namely a situation in which there exists a loose ecology of entities related to each other via their translations；the oil rig translates oil into its own terms，as does the seagull to the fish，the squirrel to the tree，or the rock to the cliff edge.Nevertheless，it would be crucial to point out that such claims do not necessitate the conclusion that real entities are to be dissolved or“overmined”into these translations，for the possibility of the latter must be premised on the fact that such objects exist in excess of—or“withdraw”from—these relations.Stated differently，an entity translates because it exists，not vice-versa.
Harman in turn distinguishes sincerity from allure.In contrast to the former，the latter describes a“and”state of affairs which unsettles the ordinary sincere flow of things.Allure is different from sincerity in that it consists of a double activity：first it produces a disturbance of the common link between a sensual object and its sensual qualities，thereby creating a disjunction between the sensual object and its sensual qualities.Second，the sensual qualities previously associated with a sensual object are thentowards the“withdrawn”real object in such a way that they subtlyor point to its being，thereby presenting one real object to anotherthrough the medium of sensual qualities which fill in for its absence.This double mechanism in turn allows one real object to indirectly（or what Harman calls“vicariously”）establish an emergent“connection”with another in such a way that this emergent entity produces retroactive effects on the respective objects.In such a case，there no longer exists a situation where one object translates another.Rather，there exists a state of affairs where two entities form an indirect connection which produces causal effects on the respective objects.
Harman calls the situation produced by allure“vicarious cause，”and he claims that the latter is always vicarious，buffered and asymmetrical.First，causality is vicarious since the notion of“withdrawal”entails that one real object can only interact with another by proxy or“vicariously”through a relational stand-in or“sensual object”acting as its translated intermediary.Second，causality is also buffered to the extent that the sensual qualities of a sensual object inhibit the direct contact between two real objects，preventing them from fusing into a seamless relational whole.Finally，causation is necessarily asymmetrical in the sense that Harman denies the possibility of reciprocal interaction between two entities，such that the mutual influence of two entities would necessarily be the result of two separate interactions.
I would like to conclude this paper by briefly inquiring into the consequences of Harman’s Object-Oriented Philosophy for anthropocentrism，the Anthropocene，and ecology.I am of the view that my paper highlighted the following results：first，it may be noted that Harman’s position is thoroughly de-anthropocentric，since it places all individual entities on equal footing，granting them equal ontological dignity and recognising the role they each specifically play within reality.Secondly，and relatedly，Harman’s philosophy implies replacing the notion of the Anthropocene with a symbiotic model in which there no longer exists the assumption an“onto-taxonomic”separation or correlation between humans and the rest of nature.Finally，and against critics of OOP，Harman’s philosophy entails a powerful ecological approach in which the objects populating the environment do in fact establish loose connections with one another，but without diminishing their reality by reducing their being to the relations they sustain.
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