Wang Xiaoping

　　Abstract： Since the late 1990s， Chinese scholars have deliberated on the issue of the establishment of a Chinese cultural subjectivity and identity for a nation rising in the international arena. Zhang Xudong’s theoretical work Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization， published in the year 2005， sparked heated debate within intellectual circles， and continued its broad influence till now. This article aims to bring Zhang’s thesis and its opponents’ opinions together， to examine their concerns and respective methodologies and shed lights on their merits and faults.

　　Keywords： Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization; Chinese identity; cultural politics; modernity; globalization

Introduction

In recent years， international politicians and scholars have found that China’s new government “aims at creating a distinct Chinese ideological framework， the ‘China Path，’ as an alternative to ‘Western’ concepts” (Shi-Kupfer， et al.). This assertion of a “China Path” is， to a certain extent， backed by a group of Chinese scholars who， ever since the late 1990s， have deliberated on the issue of establishing China’s “cultural consciousness” or “cultural self-awareness.” They call for the establishment of a Chinese cultural subjectivity and identity for a nation rising in the international arena. However， are political maneuver and cultural reflection the same thing? If not， where do they differ? Is there any differing view regarding this new cultural-political discourse? Such questions deserve a deep investigation into China’s academic world to find answers.

　　A cultural phenomenon from 2005 to 2006 is significant in this regard. A theoretical work by Zhang Xudong， a renowned Chinese scholar at New York University in the USA， attracted the interest of many Chinese readers， not only because it was a best-seller that year but also because it aroused debate among some overseas scholars. The book，was published by Peking University Press. The lasting influence of the book can be witnessed in its numerous reprints. In March 2021， the third edition of the manuscript comes out. The author now offers a new preface to the new edition， which stresses the pertinence of the project in the new age (Zhang, “Knowledge”3-22).

　　While the book was well received by ordinary Chinese readers due to its “nationalist” call for the Chinese to establish their awareness of cultural politics， it sparked heated debate within intellectual circles. Among these critiques， the articles by Gao Quanxi and Carl K.Y. Shaw particularly aroused the attention of scholars in China and abroad. They were published in the famed intellectual journal() in Taiwan. These two review essays impress readers with their eagerness for establishing constitutionalism， and inform us of the great differences between the two positions.

　　Therefore， this research note aims to bring Zhang’s thesis and its opponents’ opinions together to examine their concerns and respective methodologies. In the last part of the reflection， I will share my own reflections on the connotations of the cultural politics of “Chinese-ness.” (Zhang， “Enlightenment”27)

The Choice of German Thinkers as the Object of Research

Gao Quanxi’s criticism begins surprisingly with an outright denial of the significance and value of modernity as an academic issue： “Modernity is not a real problem for mainstream thinkers from Britain and America.” (238) If what he says is true， then Anthony Giddens (1938- )， an extremely popular sociologist in Britain， would no longer be “a mainstream thinker.” He goes further to suggest that，

　　... even for classical liberalism， so-called modernity itself is a pseudo-problem. ... In their point of view， the formation and development of a social pattern is a completely spontaneous process of evolution in which there does not exist an absolute fracture and revolutionary transformation. (240)

　　According to him， “in the thoughts of social politics and law in Britain and America from the fifteenth century to the eighteenth century， even in corresponding French thinking， the violent impingement of modernity which the Germans deeply felt did not exist.” (240) Is this really the case?

　　Among the three countries he mentioned (Britain， America and France)， the United States of America — as a state that has existed for only around 250 years — has no tradition to withstand historical onslaught. However， the intensification of the conflict between slavery in the South and industrial and commercial capitalism in the North eventually led to civil war， whereas， in France， there was the intellectual battle between theand the. The French Revolution ended the feudal system; Charles Baudelaire’s proclamations became the classic exposition of modernity. Thus， it makes no sense to say that France falls short of an awareness of modernity. As for Britain， it has the longest history of capitalism. Here we can briefly review British history to ponder how the capitalist system， taken to be “consistent with the needs of human nature” and “naturally-evolved” () (241) by Gao， was produced.

　　The opening of new routes in the sixteenth century enabled England to become the shipping center of the Atlantic. It obtained immense profit from unfair colonial trade through expanding markets and exploiting raw materials. This means of actively exploring overseas trade led to the rapid development of its wool manufacturing industry， the traditional sector of English industry. In order to adapt itself to the market， there appeared many manual workshops. The increasing scale of the development of wool manufacturing also had great effects on other sectors such as coal mining， iron smelting and shipbuilding， which all adopted production by handicraft workshops. Development then spread to rural areas with the “enclosure movement，” leading to capitalist farming. Accordingly， there emerged a number of graziers and farmers. Some of them also engaged in industry and commerce and accumulated much capital. They shared the same interests of the bourgeoisie and were known as the new aristocracy. Agricultural workers soon appeared. As a result， the British accumulated the necessary capital for the development of capitalism. Within this process， financiers， bankers， commercial capitalists and factory owners became the new bourgeoisie. As the forces of the bourgeoisie and the new aristocracy constantly strengthened， the contradiction between them and the feudal， autocratic system which represented the old means of production became more serious， ultimately sparking the bourgeois revolution in which King Charles I (1600-1649) was beheaded. In light of such facts， how could we say that there is no “fracture or revolutionary transformation” in history? Instead， the so-called “spontaneous” economic activities of British capitalist development were inseparable from its overseas expansion and trade as well as its domestic enclosure movement. Even quite a few scholars hostile to Marxism have admitted the early brutal exploitation of primitive capitalism as described in the writings of Karl Marx， and have acknowledged that it is proletarian resistance that forces the state to undertake gradual reform and implement more humane policies. Therefore， could we still argue that all the capitalist institutions were “gradually formed in the spontaneous evolution of economy， law and culture in accordance with the needs of human nature，” (241) as Gao contends?

　　Although Gao recognizes that this transformation of the historical formation — as implicit in the concept of modernity — is true， he still indicts Zhang for falling short of fundamental knowledge of modernity in Germany; he believes that， in Germany， “the rights of private property， civil society， political state and overseas colonization， world history and international public law” as well as “core propositions” such as “mutual recognition， state sovereignty， homogeneous society and cultural identity” have never been truly achieved. (239) Yet， whether those have been realized or not is not the key issue. Even if the theory of German thinkers is “the conceptual generalization of the British social experience” and granted that “the premise of the republican， constitutional state that Kant’s perpetual peace appealed for did not exist in Germany at all， Hegel’s theory of civil society is the summary of British civil society， and Marx’shas been modeled on the British capitalism，” (242) these theories themselves could not be disproven， for they have laid the foundation for related discussions to now. We cannot assume that the conceptual generalization of the British social experience can only be made by the British so as not to be idealistic rhetoric; or the modern form of capitalism under the special experience of Germany cannot be referred to as a form of capitalism， as Gao does (240). In any case， these theories are themselves widely recognized in Britain and the United States， and constitute one of the foundations of their jurisprudence.

　　By contrast， what Gao favors， as he acknowledges， is “Britain’s tradition of common law， Scotland’s political economy， America’s philosophy of positivism， and the theory of empiricism and value of conservatism.” (241) Most of them， as we may note， are purely theoretical formulations without analysis of concrete historical experience. Indeed， Germany and France are well known for their highly-developed social-historical research and philosophy， whereas Britain and America have abounded with “pure” analytical philosophy and ahistorical liberalism. The reason why theories without much historical analysis have been so much favored by the two critics might be that these non-historical treatises can relieve anxiety regarding the historical atrocities that occurred during the process of capitalist development.

　　In contrast with Gao’s article， which completely negates the value of modernity， Shaw seems much more cautious in his argumentation. He agrees that modern German culture is an important sources of Western modernity but denies that it constitutes the whole entity and the origin of Western discourse of universalism. He believes that the period from Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) to the Second World War was a destructive process and thus not worthy of study (Shaw208). However， the problem with this assertion is thatdoes not call for the Chinese to learn from the German experience， although learning a lesson from a failed experience is justified. Rather， it cautions against the ultimate consequences to which Germany submitted： internalizing and being subjected to the ideas of its competitors. Consequently， the road that Germany found and followed was not its own; it was subsumed into the Western system and was tamed by its rival， which serves as an inspirational reference for China.

　　The political and cultural identification of Zhang’s two critics with the bourgeois constitutional state means that they take the history of the West as world history， becoming the only road that China should take. By contrast，aims to demonstrate that，

　　[these things ranging] from private property to civil society， from constitutional state， international law to world history ... are nothing but the self-rendition of the political consciousness and subjectivity consciousness of the Western countries. (Zhang，23)

　　By revealing this truth，sets out to explore the nature of the Western universalist discourses of modernity.

Totality and the Dialectics of Historical Materialism

“The (function of) theoretical thinking，” as the author ofproclaims， is “to act as the intermediary between different theories， and to find the factual relevance between them.” (Zhang，21) Here， critical approaches such as new historicism， post-colonialism， structuralism， post-structuralism and hermeneutics are discussed and sometimes employed. Nevertheless， it is the Marxist dialectic of historical materialism that unifies all these approaches. To put it simply， this dialectic explains changes and development in society through historical inquiry， for only in history have human beings collectively created their ways of life. For example， the market economy and parliamentary democracy did not spontaneously emerge from human brains but were jointly created by the political， economic and cultural conditions of societies at particular social-historical conjunctures. Accordingly， to place the non-historical notions of free people and an absolute (free) economy as the presuppositions of universalist claims， as did by the two critics， is historically ungrounded.

　　Compared with Gao， critic Shaw better understands Zhang’s approach here， as he aptly generalizes： “The universal proclamations monopolized by the West must be deconstructed， reassembled and restored to the specific historical and political context.” (Shaw217) However， this is not due to the reason that “we are in the postmodern era when subjectivity and universality are strongly interrogated，” (209) implying that the undertaking inis nothing but post-structuralist trickery. Instead，“restores” the mystified and sanctified doctrines to the historical conditions from which they originated， and notes that things such as constitutional states， parliamentary democracy and market economies are all historical phenomena rather than absolute truths： there are different forms and patterns of these institutions in history， over-determined by diversified social， political and economic conditions and historical experiences.

　　Commenting on Zhang’s assertion that “The Germans have set up the law in spirit and thought for the whole modern western bourgeois class; it even can be said that the mature bourgeois system had already been given an intellectual practice or a formal rehearsal early by German romanticism，” Shaw remarks that this “fundamental presupposition” typifies Zhang’s holistic methodology (209). Elsewhere， he takes Zhang’s assertion， “The consciousness of subjectivity of a non-Western social culture must be one of totality，” as the starting point of Zhang’s argumentation， which to him is a holistic way of thinking. (214-215)

　　To me， Zhang’s argument， premised on the analysis of the cultural politics of particular nations， is a hermeneutical notion — as a whole， the whole project ofcan be taken as a hermeneutical practice. “Holism” ()， Shaw’s charge against the author， is of his own definition; nevertheless， there has never been such a term in Marxist theory. Judged by what Shaw says， “holism” to him probably refers to an arbitrary (and erroneous) framework. Nevertheless， apart from outside resemblance， the term “holism” has nothing to do with the Marxist concept of totality.

　　

　　The other major concept of Marxism is dialectic， or the dialectic of historical materialism. Simply put， everything has its dual characters and evolves in history with positive and negative sides simultaneously. While Hegel’s and Marx’s versions of dialectic both share so-called “reflexivity，” the differences lie in the fact that Hegel just reflects on the framework of the concept itself， whereas Marx goes further to explore the historical origin and generation of the concept， which is a process of demystification. In this regard， we may notice thatdoes not single-mindedly affirm or deny the abstract， non-Marxist dialectics， regardless of the dialectic of Hegel’s “negation of negation” or of Nietzsche’s “affirmation of affirmation.” Instead， it acknowledges the German thinkers’ merits in theoretical thinking and practice， but relentlessly exposes the weakness and contradiction of their propositions.

　　Because of his estrangement from Marxist theory， Shaw finds “conflicts” in the methodology of： “Zhang claims that he takes postcolonial theory as the starting point， yet his efforts to describe the presupposition of the holistic approach here are obviously inadequate.” (Shaw209) This statement shows that he not only has misunderstood the approach ofbut also is very unfamiliar with critical theory. Rather than taking postcolonial theory as his starting point， Zhang criticizes it throughout the book， especially in terms of its notion of “alternative projects of modernity.” In one place， Zhang argues that，

　　To put it bluntly， all the so-called “alternative projects of modernity” ranging from the “East Asian models” to the “post-colonial theory” in the West， are nothing but the rationalizations of the development of capitalism in some particular regions with cultural and religious particularities， aiming to establish， under the condition of global capitalism， some “semi-autonomous” power branches or subsystems in the name of “subjectivity”. ... Such “alternative projects” just aim at obtaining “identity” and “recognition” for the elite groups of some nationalities， societies and regions within the western hegemonic order. But they turn in a blank sheet in terms of the creation of a rational social order and a new cultural and political pattern， for the substance of collective historical experience has already been excluded. China’s modern history， especially the historical choice of the mass revolution and socialist modernity， is itself the creative transcendence of this “alternative project.” (Zhang，61)

　　In this regard， it is also necessary to address Shaw’s accusation that， in the so-called “self-mediation of universality，”has tried to repudiate universalism through a right-wing interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy (Shaw210). It is true thattakes universality to be the self-proclamation of certain particularity; however， its interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy aims at nothing but revealing the essence of universalism as a desire for self-affirmation.

　　Against this move， Shaw contends thatrestores “the universality represented by the concept of law or right () of western modernity to the bourgeois class’s needs for the legal and political legitimacy of its private property and contract，” in order to show that they are none other than “the special ideologies of the bourgeois class in different historical stages.” To Shaw， this practice demonstrates “the anti-historical tendency” of “reductionism.” (213) However， while it is true thatdoes not take universalistic discourses such as “natural rights and sacred private property” as natural and unquestionable， it is just because the reified concepts themselves are mystified notions to be decoded and deconstructed.

　　It is this misunderstanding that propels us to examine the methodological undertakings of the two critics. In his article， Shaw expounds the universal value in his mind：

　　In Kant’s time， the universality of the West has developed different social imagination from the moral vision， which then bred the two great Revolutions in America and France ... the development of Western modernity is the incarnation and consolidation of several macro-social imaginations， including market economy， public sphere， and the democratic system of the people’s sovereignty. (212)

　　By these statements， we can understand his presupposition： imagination inspires action; moral visions breed revolution. Here， thinking dictates action; consciousness determines existence. When the utopia of communism is seriously criticized in the present age， we witness that another utopia is unabashedly brandished.

　　In contrast to Shaw’s idealistic interpretation， Gao focuses on concrete institutions. To him， the lack of a proper political system is the source of all degradation in contemporary China， the view of which is both his starting point and his conclusion. In spite of the differences， the methodological underpinnings of the two critics are essentially the same： an ahistorical view of history and human nature as well as a sort of mechanistic determinism. They are ahistorical because both take the historical discourse of Western modernity as the universal truth， irrespective of any social-political difference in differing regions and eras.

The Dialectic between Universality and Particularity

Whatfocuses on is the critique of the discourse of universalism， which is undertaken through an analysis of bourgeois rights and jurisprudence established by German thinkers. Zhang notes that both Kant and Hegel take private property as their theoretical starting point，

　　In the eyes of the bourgeois class， the rights of the bourgeoisie are both natural and rational. ... For Kant， property is not and cannot be questioned. It is the natural starting point of history and morality. At the same time， it is rational. (Zhang，23)

　　However， for the author， this is nothing but “a moral statement and a political statement，” or a “strong self-affirmation of a historic subjectivity， and an understanding and expression of a kind of particularity with the concept of universality.” (ibid23) Indeed， the dialectic between universality and particularity is the key point of， which is also the point attacked the most. When read in detail， there are several universal discourses advanced in， and not all of them are repudiated.

　　First are the universal values held by every civilization. Any civilization， as a(lifeworld) having evolved over several hundreds (and even thousands) of years， has formed its universalistic discourse by creating their peculiar value system， which shows their ideal for society， life and politics. Vico’shas made a pioneering and extraordinary analysis of this process， contending that， since the road to universality is paved by the historical formation and development of a nation， national language， customs and ideas — as the subjects of civilization — are universal (Vico1)， which is acknowledged by.

　　Secondly， the universalistic discourses of Western modernity， such as rationality and public communication. Compared with the universal truth of all civilizations， Zhang declines their truth claims.

　　Thirdly，holds that the universalistic discourse of the rights of the bourgeois class is nothing but a moralized statement and political assertion. Rather than being a universal truth， it is a “clear， strong self-affirmation of a historical subject， and the understanding and expression of a sort of particularity with the concept of universality.” (Zhang，23)

　　Fourthly， standardization in the age of globalization appears as “a lifestyle which is subsumed into the capitalist system of production and consumption”; and it is a condition of “the postmodern globality or the global postmodernity.” (49) Zhang contends that this lifestyle determined by the transnational economy is not truly universal， but only standardization.

　　In all，reveals that the essence of the discourse of Western universalism is a dialectical process in which Western modernity， “when confronted with the conflicts arising from the historical process， gives rise to a stronger cohesion of subjectivity through more radical self-critique， so as to further promote Western modernity to a higher level of universality.” (120) Hence， it is the self-claim of particularity. In this light， rather than “exchange the positions of the West and China， as well as universality and particularity” as Shaw charges (Shaw214)， whatdoes is to urge the expansion of Chinese ethical-moral life and their development into a universal， discursive system.

　　Does this proposal demonstrate a sort of Sino-centrism that insists on ansubjectivity of China? It is undeniable that there is a difference between subjectivity and universality; the author ofholds that， in real politics， any non-Western political and cultural entity should adhere to its subjectivity. However， before the formation of a unified life world， philosophical notions of “universality” and “particularity” can only be applied within a civilization rather than across all civilizations. In other words， comparability can be a real issue only after a unified lifeworld is attained. (Zhang， “The Charm”204-235)

　　Rather than showing a mentality of Sino-centrism，often stresses that Chinese cultural self-awareness should incorporate the “Other” into itself to be more encompassing. For Zhang， the key to establishing the self-identity of Chinese culture is “not to define the boundary between modernity and ‘Western culture’ but to input new elements into the struggle for the definition of universal cultures and values” (Zhang，2)， thus creating a more open， inclusive universality.

　　Shaw， however， questions the identity of the carrier of this “subject consciousness of totality”：

　　Since only the state has the highest sovereignty in the modern world， the answer to this question is very clear： it is and can only be the state (rather than cultural tradition). More still， according to Zhang Xudong’s logic， the foundation of universal values is common law， whereas the basis of common law is national culture， and the origin of national culture is the nation-state. (Shaw216)

　　Although the resource of universal values comes from national culture (essentially civilization)， the origin of national culture is not necessarily the nation-state， though it does act as the principal carrier of national subjectivity. Rather， for， the universality originates from a relatively stable system — from the culture， psychology， morality and customs of a civilization accumulated through history. In reality， whether a civilization could expand its universal value depends on its social-political praxis. The stake lies in whether a nation or civilization has both the drive to include the Other into itself， and the historical ambition to develop new things by creatively transforming tradition and the Other.

　　On the other hand， since in the modern world only nation-states theoretically have the highest sovereignty， they do play a crucial role in building national culture. The universal framework of each civilization as the “form of life” dictates that national culture， once constituted， would not only claim sovereignty over other cultures but also impose its rules on its subjects. As to what this (national) culture is， Said has defined its internal and external boundary： It designates “not merely something to which one belongs but something that one possesses and， along with the proprietary process ... a boundary by which the concepts of what is extrinsic or intrinsic to the culture come into forceful play”; it is， in other words，

　　The power of culture by virtue of its elevated or superior position to authorize， to dominate， to legitimate， demote， interdict， and validate： in short， the power of culture to be an agent of， and perhaps the main agency for， powerful differentiation within its domain and beyond it too. (Said9)

　　From this perspective， the universal framework lays the foundation for understanding any alien culture; as Zhang Xudong unambiguously proclaims in another place，

　　

　　A universal framework is always claimed by any state aiming to maintain its cultural subjectivity; different civilizations adhere to their respective subjectivities by claiming their universality. This does not mean that the various civilizations are not compatible to each other. Rather， “civilizations do not clash， only empires do.” (Liu3)

How to Transcend the Nation-State System and Rebuild the Continuity of Medern Chinese History?

Inand the two articles， there appear two understandings of the present role of the nation-state and， correspondingly， two ways of transcendence. One holds that the function of the nation-state is declining and that a universal world led by America is gradually emerging， together with its style of democratic governance and lifestyle spreading across the world. The other insists that the nation state still plays a crucial role in safeguarding and promoting its people’s livelihood and resisting foreign military and economic aggression; in addition， Chinese civilization could play a key role in creating an alternative form of governance.

　　The concept of nation-state needs to be clarified here. In the West， the modern nation-state is taken to be constitutional. Theoretically， asgeneralizes， in the modern world， “The general will leads to the social contract， which brings out the constitutional governance， leading to the (modern) state” (Zhang102). Nevertheless， this definition does not apply to the Chinese context. Since ancient times， China has been in possession of many attributes of modern， Western nation-states; nevertheless， it still owns many functions as the carrier of civilization (387). Regarding this idiosyncratic condition， the Western sinologist Lucian Pye (1921-2008) contends that China is a civilization disguised as a nation-state， or it is a state-nation. (Mei and Tan108—114) Both critics hold that this situation becomes an obstacle that prevents China from integrating into the mainstream of Western civilization. By contrast，confirms the value of this unique condition. In particular， it affirms that in ancient China:

　　Chinese culture was a universal culture， and what the educated people were concerned about was “the world” () ... which became the Great Chinese Tradition formed over a long time. ... This cultural and psychological traditionis a precious intellectual source. (Zhang39)

　　Is this statement a nationalistic discourse? For the two critics， nationalism is no more than a narrow， arrogant mentality of uncivilized nations isolated from the mainstream of world civilization. By contrast，has adopted the definition of the British sociologist Ernest Gellner (1925-95)， taking nationalism as “primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.” (Gellener1) Since there is a “structural difference” between contemporary Chinese society and the West in the broadest sense of culture，suggests that the historical demand of the “cultural and political unity” as Gellener calls within the system should be accommodated. (Zhang， “Cultural Nationalism”) Since the practice and theory of Western constitutional nations are based on their own culture and particular history in modern times， which do not accord with China’s historical tradition and its modern experience， doeshere suggest creating a new system of jurisprudence in order to provide legitimacy for China as a “civilization-nation” or even， in a more fundamental sense， as an alternative form of “modern， constitutional nation”?

　　We must note thatobjects to narrow nationalism; hence it repeatedly warns of the danger of this narrow-mindedness and advocates building a real “world culture” by introducing various examples. (Zhang35-37) Granted these historical facts， how can we imagine a new Chinese culture which is “national” and “world” rolled into one? (18) For， the legitimacy of China as a civilization-state lies less in the fact that China has a 5000-year history than in the resources its modern history has offered. In the present moment， when China is situated at another crossroad，asserts that the priority is to rebuild “continuity” in terms of modern Chinese history.

　　In terms of this concept of “continuity”，offers some examples. In the West， the narrative of subjectivity “tends to spatialize and materialize others and historicize itself; it cuts off the historical continuity of others and links up the historical rupture of its own.” (45) One typical case of mending fractures into a continuous and coherent unity can be found in Max Weber’s analysis of the rise of capitalism. (1) In light of this historical lesson， how can we reconstruct the “continuity” for the history of modern China， namely for the years before and after 1949， and in particular， for the years before and after the reform era? Zhang tries to discern the rationality in contemporary China’s tortuous historical experience because he believes that despite the serious mistakes， detours and even setbacks in the process， still， generally there is a great deal of rationality within it. (6)

　　It is widely observed that Zhang’s stance is shared by some of China’s “New Leftists.” Gan Yang， a prominent scholar， has advocated over the past decade the integration of “three traditions” ()： the Confucian tradition， which cherishes family relations and human emotions; the Maoist heritage that stresses equality and justice; and the market tradition of Deng’s praxis of reform and opening-up， which highlights efficiency (Gan1—3). Apparently， the continuity that Gan underlines is not between the ancient and the modern but between Mao’s socialism and Deng’s market-oriented praxis. It seems that the Party has accepted this strategy in recent years and applied it in its propaganda (Shi-Kupfer， et al.).

　　However， is this version of continuity the same as Zhang’s proposal? In reality， the state merely favors a pragmatic use of this rhetoric but does not bother to explain a “great deal of rationality” as Zhang suggests. Besides， what kind of value has China’s modern history provided? The two critics hold thatdoes not offer a set of universal values and question the identity of the carrier of the so-called “cultural politics.” Indeed，does not offer a comprehensive system in this respect， for that is what it is calling for. However， when going through the whole book， we may find many key hints. For instance，has referred to the universal framework provided by Chinese civilization. However， it also holds that this is not enough to challenge the holistic system of Western capitalism. (Zhang11) Instead， China’s socialist practice offers a more valuable alternative. Mao’s socialist China used to be an extremely powerful nation with an extraordinary capacity for social and ideological mobilization with its particular values and ideals. As a new historical subject， it integrates modern Western culture — such as Enlightenment concepts of equality， fairness and justice — into its self-consciousness. It is thus compatible with the conditions of modernity， but at the same time transcends its historical limitations (Zhang9).

Tensions and Dilemmas： Whose Cultural Politics?

Thus said， I must stress that， many merits aside， Zhang’s analytical scheme is filled with tensions， which are shown both in its methodology and content. We might start our analysis with the “tension” which he believes exists in present Chinese society.contends that one of the key contradictions in contemporary China is “the conflict and contradiction between the ideology of mass revolution， such as equality， justice， democracy and so on， and the ‘rational choice’ for the development of the economy， such as liberty， prosperity， and so on.” (Zhang4) That is to say， the contradiction between the objective demands of efficiency and the subjective ideal of fairness is something of an antinomy or paradox.

　　However， Zhang would not deny the fact that this antinomy is merely a fake paradox caused by the established mode of production. To put it another way， we may question whether so-called “rational choice” is the patent of capitalist modernity or whether socialist modernity only refers to the ideology of mass revolution but includes nothing like “rational choice.” Without clarifying this confusion， the “contradiction” mentioned by the author here seems to be a tension between (capitalist) “rational choice” and socialist mass democracy.

　　The tension is also witnessed in the book’s methodology. On the one hand，presents a Marxist analysis that demythicizes “bourgeois rights”; on the other hand， the two most significant Marxist approaches — class analysis and political-economic analysis — are rarely witnessed here. Without the latter， the arguments of “cultural identity” become questionable. That is to say， the concern about cultural politics between nations (or civilizations) has prevailed and replaced the engagement with the substantive content of political economy and political culture; this makes the purpose of the research ambiguous. Does the author ofattempt to do as the bourgeois scholar Max Weber did： appeal for the state to compete for cultural superiority for the rise of a great power? Or does he aims to carry forward the values of China’s socialist revolution by calling for socialist re-orientation， a call resembling that of Marxist theorist George Lukacs?

　　Zhang nevertheless hesitates， which is shown in the hypothesis and a series of self-contradictory statements. For one， when commenting on the “key contradiction” in contemporary Chinese society — the conflict between the ideology of mass revolution and “rational choice” — he asserts that “both in theory and observed from historical experience， the two are not necessarily contradictory; or this contradiction is not necessarily incompatible.” Instead， “The view that the two are incompatible actually stems from the ideological bias of the global age， which is external to the contradiction itself.” (Zhang，4) Indeed， from a Marxist perspective， the conflict between efficiency and fairness is specious. The solution to this antinomy relies on the historical rearrangement of political and economic relations to solve the contradiction between productive forces and productive relations in society.

　　Also because of this confusion， readers on the one hand find the implied idea of “sublating” bourgeois rights inwhen it exposes the naturalization of property rights; on the other hand， apart from demanding that the Chinese elites take care of the interests of disadvantaged groups， there seems to be no alternative. Distinct from Zhang’s optimistic view， some scholars contend that the living standard of the fourth estate might be improved， but it would not be true masters of themselves. Apparently， Zhang must respond to this view in order to support the premise of his hypothesis. Indeed， when Zhang remarks that “this class， maybe unconsciously， happens to be the representative of the interests of all classes in society as a whole，” (4) he probably refers to the newly-born “middle classes” but not the working class， a departure from his seemingly Marxist position.

　　Therefore， the dilemma still exists. Although Zhang holds that mass revolution as well as the historical choice of socialist modernity has creatively transcended the “alternative modernity” of the postcolonial countries， he admits that there is not yet a complete “scheme of replacement” to supersede the capitalist mode of production. How then to wrestle with this problem? How can China， which is developing its capital market， manipulate capital effectively instead of being controlled by it? The answers to these questions are the key to the argument’s premise.

Conclusion

Bothand Gao’s article propose the question? Gao holds that this question is essentially not about cultural politics but pertains to the arrangement of political system (Gao254). While acknowledging the necessity of institutional arrangement， it needs to be stressed that to establish one’s cultural identity is ultimately an issue of value judgment， which pertains to the realm of culture and cultural politics (Zhang383-84). Should the Chinese seek the answers in the bourgeois-Christian lifeworld and its civilization or in the Chinese ethical-moral world within its peculiar cultural tradition? The moment of this pursuit is the time when culture and politics become intertwined.

　　By contrast，holds that the key to find the identity of (modern) Chinese culture is to inject new elements into the struggle for defining universal culture and values. Nevertheless， while the author insists that the socialist new China which carries on the Chinese lifeworld has gone beyond the historical framework of the constitutional state of Western civil society， we wonder whether contemporary China would fall back once more into this framework? When he proposes that the value impulse and political instincts precipitated in the unconscious of the masses is the root cause of the legitimacy of the leading class， we ponder who is the leading class in contemporary China? When the author argues that the history of the Chinese revolution and national liberation in the twentieth century has determined that the masses and mass democracy constitute the core content of the positive value of Chinese modernity， we also want to learn how to develop substantive democracy in China when procedural democracy is still immature.

　　That is to say， only after a fair development of the socialist political economy and socialist political culture can there be a meaningful exploration of a fruitful cultural politics in contemporary China. If one of the key differences between socialism and capitalism is that socialism is more democratic， thus promoting more social progress， whereas the dominant contradiction in capitalist society is that it cannot realize the substantive democracy or full potential of the ideal of modernity， then what critical intellectuals need to do first and foremost is to call for fulfilling the prerequisite for the modern form of Chinese-ness or Chinese identity， namely to restore so-called “continuity” in reality rather than just in theory. This， I believe， is what a meaningful “cultural politics” means for the author of.

　　甘阳： 《通三统》。北京： 生活·读书·新知三联书店，2007年。

　　[Gan， Yang.. Beijing： SDX Joint Publishing Company， 2007.]

　　高全喜： 《文化政治与现代性问题之真伪》，《思想》3(2006)： 237—56。

　　[Gao， Quanxi. “Cultural Politics and the Authenticity of the Issue of Modernity.”3(2006)： 237-56]

　　Gellener， Ernest.. Ithaca， NY： Cornell University Press， 1983.

　　Liu， Lydia H.：. Cambridge， MA： Harvard University Press， 2004.

　　梅祖蓉 谭君久： 《关于白鲁恂中国政治文化研究的评价与研究综述》，《国外社会科学》2(2011)： 108—14。

　　[Mei Zurong， and Tan Junjiu. “Evaluation and Review of Lucian Pye’s Studies of Chinese Politics and Culture.”2(2011)： 108-14.]

　　Said， Edward. “Introduction： Secular Criticism，”，. Cambridge， MA： Harvard University Press， 1983.1-16.

　　Shi-Kupfer， Kristin， Mareike Ohlberg， Simon Lang， and Bertram Lang. “Ideas and Ideologies Competing for China’s Political Future，”：. Accessed on December 21，2018. https：//www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-01/171004_MPOC_05_Ideologies_0.pdf

　　Vico， Giambattista.. Trans. Thomas Goddard Bangin and Max Harold Fisch. Ithaca， NY： Cornell University Press， 1984.

　　萧高彦： 《“文化政治”的魅力与贫困》，《思想》3(2006)： 204—35。

　　[Xiao， Gaoyan (Carl K.Y. Shaw). “The Charm and Poverty of ‘Cultural Politics’”.3(2006)： 204-35.]

　　Zhang， Xudong. “Political Philosophy and Comparison： Bourgeois Identity and the Narrative of the Universal.”2(2005)： 81-107.

　　- - -. “Enlightenment and the Dialectic of Particular and Universal： Toward A Cultural-Political Notion of Modern Identity Formation.”Eds. Nakamima Takahim and Hui Jiang. Tokyo： University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy， 2011.11-28.

　　张旭东： 《全球化时代的文化认同》。北京： 北京大学出版社，2005。

　　[Zhang， Xudong.. Beijing： Peking University Press， 2005.]

　　——： 《文化民族主义、“挫折感”，与中国学人的精神使命——驳薛涌〈甘阳与文化民族主义〉》，《21世纪经济报道》2003年8月14日。

　　[- - -. “Cultural Nationalism， ‘Sense of Frustration’， and the Intellectual Mission of Chinese Scholars.”. August 14，2003.]

　　——： 《当代普遍性论述的知识谱系，文化政治与历史决定》，《东方学刊》4.1(2021)： 3—22。

　　[- - -. “Knowledge Genealogy， Cultural Politics and Historical Decisions of Contemporary Universalist Discourse： Discussion Cultural Identity in the Age of Globalization.”4.1(2021)： 3-22.]